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ABSTRACT 
SINIAPKIN, ARIELLE Survival processing and false memories. Department of 
Psychology, June 2013. 
ADVISOR: Daniel Burns 
Some researchers speculate memory systems are adaptations that arose to enable 
the storage of survival related information. Supporting this view, information processed 
for survival relevance and death relevance has been shown to produce a memory 
advantage that is superior to deep processing control conditions. While these procedures 
increase recall, the information retrieved is not necessarily accurate. The purpose of the 
present study was to investigate the effects of survival processing and death processing 
on the formation of false memories. In addition, through analyses of cumulative recall 
curves the extent of relational and item-specific processing was examined to explore the 
proximate mechanisms underlying the effects. 
Participants were placed into a survival, death, moving, or pleasantness condition.  They 
were instructed to rate lists of words, which have been shown to produce false memories, 
for their relevance to the given scenarios. It was predicted that if death processing and 
survival processing are related, then participants would recall a similar number of list 
items and false memories.  Although not significant, analyses of the surprise memory 
task revealed the survival condition had the highest numerical recall of list items, while 
the death condition had the lowest.  The death condition significantly differed from the 
other conditions by producing the highest recall of false memories. The survival 
condition did not lead to an increase in false memories.  Overall, the results suggest 
survival and dying scenarios do not share similar underlying mechanisms.   
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SURVIVAL PROCESSING: AN OVERVIEW 
Typically, evolutionary theories are used to explain modern day occurrences 
(Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2007). These inferences can be problematic because 
evolutionary explanations often rely solely on logic; researchers cannot delve into the 
minds of human ancestors, or know with certainty the conditions prevalent in ancestral 
environments, thus they are unable to produce empirical evidence for their hypotheses.   
Instead of observing a modern day phenomenon and trying to explain the 
occurrence through evolutionary theory, however, researchers occasionally use 
evolutionary reasoning to make predictions about human behavior. Researchers are 
currently using this approach to speculate on the development of human memory (Nairne 
et al., 2007).  Why do we have memories? From an evolutionary perspective, episodic 
memories are adaptations that allow humans to reflect on episodes from the past not 
simply to reminisce, but to plan for the future (e.g., Kahneman, 2010). According to 
researchers, memory systems formed as a result of evolutionary pressures (Nairne et al., 
2007).  By storing survival-relevant information, such as the location of food resources or 
dangerous predators, memories increase the genetic fitness of individuals by enhancing 
their likelihood of surviving and reproducing (Nairne et al.).   
If memory systems are adaptations, then memory systems should be the most 
efficient in situations reminiscent of the ancestral contexts they arose from (Nairne et al., 
2007).  Furthermore, if memory systems evolved because they enabled individuals to 
store information related to survival, then our modern memory systems should also be 
sensitive to processing and encoding survival related information.  Additionally, if 
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memory systems are attuned for encoding this particular type of information, then 
instilling thoughts of survival should enhance memory recollection (Nairne et al., 2007). 
In order to explore one possible reason underlying the evolution of human 
memory: that memory systems evolved to store survival-relevant information, Nairne et 
al. (2007) examined how well stimuli were remembered when they were processed for 
their survival relevance. Individuals in the experimental condition were instructed to 
imagine themselves deserted in the grasslands of a foreign land, lacking basic materials 
necessary for survival.  They were informed over the next few months they would need to 
find food, water, and a means of protecting themselves from predators. Next, they were 
instructed to rate common nouns for their survival significance, while those in the control 
condition rated the same nouns for their personal significance, pleasantness, or relevance 
to moving to a foreign land (Nairne al., 2007).  Next, participants were given a distractor 
task before the administration of a surprise memory test.  Across four experiments, the 
researchers found participants’ memory systems were more responsive to the encoding of 
nouns processed for their survival relevance than for all other conditions.  In other words, 
both recall and recognition was higher for the survival group than for any of the control 
groups. 
Nairne al. (2007) wanted to extend their findings and rule out alternative 
possibilities that could explain the survival processing advantage.  They found the 
survival processing effect for both within-, as well as between-subject designs.  They 
questioned whether the level of processing might be deeper for survival than the other 
conditions.  As a result, they used a self-referencing task as a comparison group in their 
fourth experiment.  This task instills a deep, semantic level of processing that presumably 
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is not related to survival. They obtained the same recall advantage for the survival 
condition, suggesting that survival processing significantly enhances retention above that 
produced by self-referential processing.  In addition, they also measured reaction times, 
or the amount of time individuals spent making decisions regarding the relevance of the 
nouns to the scenarios or their pleasantness value.  They speculated if individuals spent 
longer amounts of time making decisions in the survival condition than in the other 
conditions, then reaction time might be the reason for the survival enhancement effect. 
They found no difference, however, in participants’ reaction times across conditions.  
Finally, they wanted to examine whether the enhancement was due to the beneficial 
effects of congruous target encodings: individuals who rate the words highly are more 
likely to remember the words than if they rate them lower (see Nairne et al., 2007).  
Consequently, if participants rated the nouns on average more highly in the survival 
condition compared with the other conditions then the results could be attributed to this 
congruity effect.  The researchers found no significant difference in ratings between 
conditions and were thus able to rule out the influence of this effect.  Overall, participants 
who rated common nouns for their survival relevance had the best recall and recognition 
in their studies. Therefore, their results support the notion our memory systems evolved 
to give humans a unique survival advantage by recording survival related information 
(Nairne al., 2007).   
In accordance with Nairne et al.’s findings (2007), Weinstein, Bugg and Roediger 
(2008) first replicated their original experiment and also found a significant difference 
between individuals placed into the grassland survival scenario and those assigned to 
other deep processing conditions. They also claimed the elaborateness of the instructions 
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might have caused participants to process the scenario more deeply, which in turn lead to 
the memory enhancements. Thus, in their second experiment, they tested whether the 
recall advantage continued when the control condition matched the survival processing 
condition in terms of schematic processing, or level of detail given to the scenario. For 
their new scenario, they used an urban, modern environment that only differed from the 
survival scenario in terms of the situations’ evolutionary relevance.  They found 
individuals who rated words for survival relevance and were placed into the grasslands 
scenario had superior recall to those placed into the city scenario. This finding suggests 
modern memory systems have ancestral priorities, which provides further support for an 
evolutionary account of human memory.   
Exploring the survival processing enhancement effect further, a subsequent study 
conducted by Nairne and Padeirada (2010) replicated and extended Weintein et al.’s 
(2008) results.  In the study, the researchers focused on the ultimate mechanism(s) 
underlying the processing advantage.  They used two survival scenarios in their study: 
participants either read about an ancestral environment, the grasslands, or about a modern 
environment, a city, before they were given a word list that they would later be asked to 
recall.  They found that participants who imagined being placed in the grasslands 
scenario had greater recall of list words than participants who imagined being placed in 
the city scenario.  They concluded our memory systems are sensitive to ancestral 
priorities, and attuned to encoding survival related data.  The responsiveness of memory 
systems to ancestral environments provides further support for the theory that memories 
are the result of evolutionary pressures (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2010).  
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On the other hand, when Soderstrom and McCabe (2011) tried to replicate these 
findings, they found no difference between participants’ recall rates for the modern, or 
city, and the ancestral, or grasslands scenarios.  Further, they found recall was actually 
greater for participants who were placed into the modern survival scenario where 
zombies were described as the threat compared with participants placed into the ancestral 
scenario where predators were the threat, thereby challenging the notion human memory 
adapted for survival processing and would therefore be most efficient in ancestral 
environments.   
Further illuminating the strength of the survival processing effect, Nairne, 
Pandeirada, and Thompson (2008) found recall for survival processing of items was 
greater than recall for deep processing control conditions which included: imaginal 
processing, pleasantness rating, generation, and intentional memory. Bell, Roer, and 
Buchner (2013) also conducted a study testing the generalizability of the survival 
processing effect.  They used a suicide scenario as a comparison group, and found 
participants given the survival scenario had superior recall when compared with those in 
the suicide scenario.  Thus, the survival processing effect does not appear to be due to 
enhanced processing resulting from the negativity of the subject matter.  The	  findings	  across	  various	  experiments	  demonstrate	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  survival	  processing	  enhancement	  effect.	  Overall,	  the	  researchers’	  discoveries	  that	  memories	  are	  enhanced	  when	  participants	  are	  instructed	  to	  rate	  words	  for	  their	  survival	  relevance	  support	  the	  notion	  our	  memory	  systems	  resulted	  from	  evolutionary	  pressures.	  	  The	  survival	  processing	  enhancement	  effect	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  this	  adaptation	  that	  is	  visible	  today.	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Survival Processing: Proximate Mechanisms 
While researchers have speculated about the ultimate reasons for the survival 
processing enhancement effect, some have begun to study the proximate mechanisms. 
For example, Burns, Burns and Hwang (2011) questioned whether differences in item-
specific and relational processing could explain the effect. They analyzed cumulative-
recall curves, and measured item gains, and item losses over subsequent memory tests in 
order to assess differences in item-specific and relational processing. Because I plan to 
use several of these measures, they will be will described next. 
Item-specific processing occurs when individuals encode distinctive 
characteristics of individual items, thereby providing unique retrieval cues for each item. 
Relational processing occurs when individuals encode how items relate to one another.  
Therefore, this type of processing creates an organized retrieval plan for the encoded 
information.  
In order to differentiate between item-specific and relational processing, the 
analysis of cumulative-recall curves may be used. It has been shown that item-specific 
processing produces more gradual cumulative-recall curves that consistently approach 
asymptotic levels when compared with relational processing (e.g., Burns & Schoff, 
1998). The assumption is that when an individual uses item-specific processing, the cues 
they encode aid in single-item retrieval only, which accounts for the slower, steadier 
recall.  On the other hand, relational processing produces cumulative-recall curves with 
steeper initial slopes that taper off more quickly as they approach asymptotic levels 
because the relational cues provide a systematic method of recovery of the list items, 
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which results in rapid initial recall of word items that have been grouped together (e.g., 
Burns & Schoff, 1998).  
Burns (1993) also argued that item-specific and relational processing can be 
deduced by looking at the number of item gains and item losses in a repeated testing 
procedure, whereby participants are given multiple recall tests in a row without any 
additional studying between testing. The amount of relational processing an individual 
uses is inversely related to item losses, or the number of items forgotten across 
subsequent recall tests, because relational processing provides organized retrieval of the 
list items, where the same relational cues are used across different tests. Moreover, the 
amount of item-specific processing an individual uses is directly related to item gains, or 
the number of new items that are recalled across subsequent tests that are not recalled 
during the first test. An increase in item-gains is indicative of item specific processing 
because there are many potential retrieval cues for each item, and some cues that are not 
used on the first test may be used on later tests (Burns, 1993). 
Through the examination of cumulative-recall curves, Burns, et al. (2011) have 
examined the proximate mechanisms likely underlying the survival processing 
enhancement effect.  Across four experiments, they found survival processing produced 
superior recall to conditions that elicited only relational processing, or only item-specific 
processing.  However, when control conditions had both relational and item-specific 
processing, the survival enhancement effect disappeared.  The cumulative-recall curves 
illustrated the survival-rating task produced a significantly steeper curve than the one 
produced by the pleasantness group.  However, survival processing tended to produce 
superior performance only in the later portions of the recall period compared to 
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conditions performing only relational processing. Their results signify that survival 
processing most likely promotes both relational and item-specific processing, which 
makes it unique because most control conditions produce only one type of processing.     
Burns, Hart, Griffith and Burns (2012) decided to test this two-process 
explanation using non-survival scenarios as control conditions, rather than pleasantness 
rating.  In both a between-lists and within-list design, researchers found participants in 
the survival scenario had improved recall relative to those in the moving scenario.  Based 
on their analysis of cumulative-recall curves, which showed that the recall difference 
only emerged late in the recall period, it was concluded that the difference in recall was 
caused by a difference in the level of item-specific processing, and not relational 
processing. Thus, while survival processing enhances both item specific and relational 
processing, the overall memory advantage relative to other scenarios may be due only to 
greater item-specific processing.   
False Memories  
Researchers have begun to assess the accuracy of the memories that are elicited 
by the survival processing effect.  In particular, they have examined the effects of 
survival processing on participants’ memories using the Deese, Roediger, and 
McDermott (DRM) procedure, which is a popular research method for creating and 
studying false memories, or recollections of information that is never directly presented 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  
How are false memories created? 
Fuzzy trace theory asserts that during the formation of a new memory an 
individual creates two memory traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; Reyna & Brainerd, 
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1995). The first trace is a detailed description, while the second trace has semantic value 
and is a more general overview of the information being stored. According to theorists, 
the second trace remains in memory much longer than the first trace.  Thus, if a lot of 
time elapses between encoding and retrieval of a particular memory, then individuals will 
use the second “fuzzier” trace, which ultimately leads to a higher instance of false 
recollections.   
Alternatively, some researchers argue source-monitoring theory adequately 
explains the formation of false memories (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). The 
theory proposes if individuals do not encode sufficient detail in memory, the lack of 
information does not allow accurate determination of the source of the information as 
either internal or external.  Therefore, upon retrieval an individual must make a judgment 
call as to the source of the information.  Occasionally, this decision making process 
results in misattributions.  Typically, externally generated memories are more elaborate.  
If an imaginary event is given a lot of detail, however, an individual may incorrectly 
attribute the memory to an external source, thereby creating a false memory of the event.   
Activation Monitoring theory is an extension of the source monitoring view, and 
is now more prominent than both the original source monitoring theory, and spreading 
activation theory (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 
2001). This theory, which lays the basis for the DRM procedure, contends semantically 
related words cause particular concepts to become activated, or more readily brought to 
consciousness, and once activated individuals misremember the related concept as being 
externally generated because of source identification failure.   
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All of these theories have been used to explain the formation of false memories in 
the DRM procedure.  During this procedure, participants are presented a series of word 
lists comprised of list items that are all centered around one critical item, which is not 
presented on the list. For example, list items may include: bed, rest, tired, dream, and 
slumber, which all center around the critical lure, sleep.  Typically, researchers find 
participants false recognize or recall the critical lure as frequently as they remember list 
items. Individuals are also confident in their assertions that the false memories are in fact, 
true (e.g., Payne, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996). 
Exploring the mechanisms underlying illusory memories, Burns, Martens, 
Bertoni, Sweeny, and Lividini (2006) analyzed cumulative-recall curves, item gains, and 
item losses of both list items and critical lures using the DRM paradigm, or false memory 
procedure, on multiple tests.  The first experiment examined item gains and losses in 
order to compare the amount of relational and item-specific processing participants 
perform on critical lures and list items.  Participants were informed they would hear a list 
of words presented that they would later be asked to recall.  They were given several 
DRM lists in succession before they were asked to recall all of the words. An analysis of 
the cumulative recall curves revealed the critical lures had slower, steadier recall when 
compared with the list items.  Further, critical lures produced more item gains, and list 
items produced fewer item losses across successive tests.  These findings lead the 
researchers to infer the list items received more relational processing, while the critical 
lures received more item-specific processing.   
The researchers proposed two possible hypotheses to explain the surprising 
finding that critical lures seemed to receive  more item specific processing when 
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compared with list items.  First, critical lures may receive more conceptual detail as a 
result of being activated by the list items. Second, critical lures may receive relational 
processing, but the encoded relational information is not used as part of the individual’s 
retrieval scheme.  
According to the first hypothesis, if critical lures receive more detail, then they 
should continue to receive item-specific processing when physically presented in the list.  
They should also have more item gains than list items across successive tests. If the 
second explanation is correct, then physically presenting critical items in the list should 
cause relational information to be integrated into the retrieval plan.  
To test between these two explanations, they conducted an experiment where they 
replaced one list item from each of the ten DRM word lists with the critical lure (Burns et 
al., 2006).  By physically presenting the critical lure, the researchers allowed the critical 
lures to be used in the participant’s retrieval plan.  After examining cumulative-recall 
curves, researchers found the critical items continued to receive more item-specific 
processing, but also received relational processing, to the extent that  they received as 
much relational processing as the other list items. In their final experiment, when they 
presented critical items to participants that were less related to the other list items they 
found the critical lures’ item-gain advantage from the initial experiments was eliminated.  
Thus, they concluded critical items that are not physically presented receive more item-
specific processing than list items because of their strong association to the other list 
items, which causes an increase in activation.  Their findings also support the contention 
that critical lures are only incorporated into an organized retrieval plan if they are 
physically presented in the DRM list.  
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False Memories in Survival Processing  
If survival processing is a result of natural selection, Otgar and Smeets argued that 
it should prioritize the encoding of true memories while minimizing false recollections 
(2010). They used net accuracy scores, or ratios of true recall to true recall plus false 
recall, to examine the accuracy of adults’ adaptive memories.  They found no recall 
advantage in terms of net accuracy for survival processing because survival processing 
increased both true and false memories.  However, they noted that these false memories 
may not necessarily be maladaptive, but could be viewed as side effects of an adaptive 
memory strategy, namely the ability to attend to survival-related materials by scanning 
the environment quickly, and efficiently while gleaning survival-related information.  
Even if the information is not entirely accurate, if it is relevant to one’s survival 
processing it still may enhance an individual’s ability to survive. For instance, if an 
individual falsely recalls the location of a predator within the environment, the false 
information may cause them to be more cautious, and attune to other possible dangers 
within the environment, which ultimately increases his or her genetic fitness.  
 Howe and Derbish (2010) found that not only does survival processing produce 
high true and false recall, but survival-related words (battle, conflict, disease) were also 
better recalled and were more susceptible to the false memory illusion than negative or 
neutral words that were not survival relevant, regardless of whether an intentional 
memory paradigm or incidental memory task was used.  Further, survival-related 
concepts, such as injury and death were more likely to promote false memories than 
control concepts, exemplifying the broadness of the effect.  Based on these findings, 
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humans appear to process survival information differently than other materials, which 
cause an increase in false recognition and recall.     
Death and Survival Processing 
Theorists have speculated that survival processing may activate numerous 
encoding mechanisms (Nairne et al., 2007).  Recently, some researchers speculated the 
memorial benefits that occur from thoughts of survival might be the result of death 
related cognitions (e.g., Burns, Hart, & Kramer, 2013).  This assumption is logical 
because thoughts of death and survival are both evolutionarily significant, and highly 
related.   
Burns, et al.(2013) reasoned if survival processing leads to mortality salience, 
then dying scenarios that preclude survival processing should produce the same memory 
benefits as those produced by survival scenarios. In order to test this assumption, they 
constructed a dying scenario where participants were instructed to imagine being 
diagnosed as terminally ill with no hope of survival, thereby eliminating survival 
processing.  Over the course of three experiments, they compared the dying scenario with 
the classic grasslands survival scenario as well as a pleasantness rating control group.  
They attempted to closely match the scenarios in terms of thematic structure, 
concreteness, and detail.  Additionally, pilot tests were conducted to ensure the list items 
were equally matched for their relevance to each scenario. They found memory recall for 
death processing was equal to the memory recall for survival processing.  Thinking about 
dying, without thoughts of survival, activates a recall advantage that is similar to the 
survival processing advantage.  Therefore, their studies point to overlapping mechanisms 
between survival and death processing. In contrast, when Klein (2012) and Bell et al. 
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(2013) conducted a similar study, they found death scenarios did not produce memorial 
benefits to the same extent as survival scenarios.  However, the researchers, did not 
control for word relevance or equate the death and survival scenarios in their studies, 
which casts doubts upon the soundness of their conclusions.   
The Present Study 
The association between survival processing and death processing, however, 
remains largely unexplored.  The current study attempts to more thoroughly examine the 
relationship between survival processing and death processing.  Specifically, the present 
study was designed to compare the effects of survival processing and death processing on 
the creation of false memories using the DRM paradigm to elucidate whether the 
proximate mechanisms underlying the two effects are similar. If the two are similar, then 
dying scenarios should produce false memories to the same extent as the survival 
scenarios.   
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups: survival processing, 
death processing, moving or pleasantness. Both the moving and pleasantness groups were 
used as control conditions.  Participants were shown DRM word lists, and depending on 
their randomly assigned group, they were instructed to rate the relevance of each DRM 
word to surviving, moving, or death, or to rate its pleasantness value.  The rating scale 
used ranged from 1-4, with 1 being extremely irrelevant or unpleasant, and 4 being 
extremely relevant or pleasant.   
Through an examination of item-gains, losses, and cumulative-recall curves the 
outcomes for the pleasantness and moving control conditions will be used to compare 
against both the survival and death processing conditions to determine the extent that 
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participants utilize item-specific and relational processing while encoding words in the 
experimental conditions.  Based on previous studies, the pleasantness rating control 
condition, which is known to induce item-specific processing of DRM list items, should 
cause a decrease in false memories. Therefore, if survival processing increases item-
specific processing of the DRM list items, there should also be a decrease in the 
occurrence of false memories, and a pattern similar to the pleasantness rating control 
condition. If, on the other hand, survival processing increases relational processing of the 
DRM list items, then we would expect to see an increase in item-specific processing of 
the critical lures, and an increase in the prevalence of false memories.  Further, if death 
processing has similar proximate mechanisms to survival processing, then participants’ 
recall rates of false memories should be equivalent, and the cumulative recall curves 
should also be similar.  
Method 
Participants  
Eighty-seven undergraduate students at Union College participated in this experiment. 
However, one participant’s data was not used because they failed to follow the 
instructions to recall the words presented on the computer screen, and instead recalled the 
words presented on the PANAS scale.  In exchange for their involvement, participants 
received either six dollars, or credit towards their introductory psychology or research 
methods course activities requirement.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four groups, and they were tested individually in separate rooms. Sessions lasted for 
approximately forty-five minutes.  Twenty participants were tested in the death and 
pleasantness conditions, twenty-one in the survival condition, and twenty-two in the 
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moving condition.  
Materials  
DRM lists. Participants were presented with one long list that consisted of ten shorter 
lists composed of 10 words each (see Appendix A). All of the 10 words within each list 
were semantically related, for example, “bed, rest, tired and dream” moreover, all of the 
10 words within each list centered on a word (the critical lure) that was not presented.  In 
the example above, all of the words were related to the critical lure, sleep. A pilot study 
was conducted to ensure that the final list of items used were equally congruent to the 
survival, dying, and moving scenarios.  In the pilot study, participants were instructed to 
rate list items selected from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo’s (2001) study for 
their relevance to survival, dying, and moving.  Afterwards, the mean survival, dying, 
and moving rating, was computed for each word.  Ten word lists containing ten words 
within each list were chosen based on the mean ratings such that overall the mean ratings 
for the three scenarios were nearly identical (Survival= 2.20, Death= 2.11, Moving= 
2.18) 
Design and procedure 
A between-subjects design with the following conditions functioning as different levels 
of a single independent variable was used: death, survival, moving, and pleasantness. The 
four conditions differed with respect to the instructions they were read regarding the 
word rating task.   
Participants were read one of the following sets of instructions: 
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Survival. “In this task, we would like you to imagine you are stranded in the grasslands 
of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials. Over the next few months, you’ll 
need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from predators. We 
are going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how relevant each of 
these words would be for you in this survival situation.  Some of the words may be 
relevant and others may not. It is up to you to decide. 
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 = 
somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the 
words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key.  You have four seconds to respond.  Please try 
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.   
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further 
instructions.  When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle. 
Are there any questions?” 
 
Moving. “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are planning to move to a 
new home in a foreign land. Over the next few months, you’ll need to locate and 
purchase a new home and transport your belongings.  
We are going to show you a list of words and we would like you to rate how relevant 
each of these words would be for you in this moving situation.  Some of the words may 
be relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide. 
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 = 
somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the 
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words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key.  You have four seconds to respond.  Please try 
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.   
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further 
instructions.  When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle. 
Are there any questions?” 
 
Pleasantness. “In this task, you will be shown a series of words one at a time.  Your task 
is to rate how pleasant or unpleasant each word seems to you. Some of the words may be 
pleasant to you and others may not be pleasant.  It is up to you to decide.  
We would like you to rate each word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally unpleasant, 2 = 
somewhat unpleasant, 3 = somewhat pleasant, & 4 = totally pleasant. You will rate the 
words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key.  You have four seconds to respond.  Please try 
your best to respond before the four seconds are up.   
After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait for further 
instructions.  When you see that message, please open the door to your cubicle. 
Are there any questions?” 
Death. “In this task, we would like you to imagine that you have been diagnosed as 
terminally ill, with no hope of surviving. Over the next few months, you’ll need to give 
away your belongings, say good bye to loved ones, and find ways to ease your suffering.  
We are going to show you a list of words and we would like you to rate how relevant 
each of these words would be for you in this dying situation.  Some of the words may be 
relevant and others may not. It’s up to you to decide.  We would like you to rate each 
word on a 1-4 scale, where 1 = totally irrelevant, 2 = somewhat irrelevant, 3 = somewhat 
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relevant, & 4 = totally relevant. You will rate the words by pressing the 1, 2, 3, or 4 key.  
You have four seconds to respond.  Please try your best to respond before the four 
seconds are up. After you have rated all of the words, the computer will ask you to wait 
for further instructions.  When you see that message, please open the door to your 
cubicle.  Are there any questions? 
All of the words were presented one at a time on the computer screen.  They were 
presented in the same order for all participants, with each word shown for 4 seconds.  
Two practice words were included to make sure the participants had time to adjust to, and 
fully understood, the procedure.  Participants were given no information regarding the 
upcoming recall task. Following the word-rating task, participants were given a packet.  
The first page of the packet was the positive and negative affect scale (PANAS), which 
was presented both to delay recall and to assess possible changes in affect resulting from 
exposure to the different scenarios. Participants were given a 2.5-minute distractor task 
(The PANAS), where they were given 20 words describing feelings or emotions and were 
told, to rate on a 1-5 scale the extent to which each word described how they were feeling 
at the\at moment.  
 Following the PANAS, participants were given a 10 minute long surprise recall task.  
They were told, “In a moment, I am going to ask you to remember and write-down as 
many of the words that you saw earlier on the computer screen as you can.  These are the 
words you rated on the 1-4 scale, not the words you just rated on the piece of paper.  
Please be reasonably sure the word was presented before writing it down. You can write 
the words down in any order you like.  You don't have to write them in the order they 
were shown. You will be given plenty of time to write-down the words.  However, every 
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so often, you will hear the tape recorder say, "Now draw a line".  When you hear this 
message, please draw a line under the last word you just recalled, and then continue 
trying to recall more words.  If you haven't recalled any new words since the last time 
you were asked to draw a line, then draw a second line under the last line.  Are there any 
questions?” The recall task lasted 10 minutes.     
Results  
For each participant the PANAS produced a positive and negative affect score.  
The mean affect scores are presented in Table 1. The mean positive and negative affect 
scores were relatively consistent across the four conditions.  A oneway between subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effects of the different 
levels of the independent variable: survival, death, moving, or pleasantness rating group 
on positive and negative affect.  The ANOVA revealed no significant difference between 
conditions in positive affect or negative affect, F (3, 82) = 0.236, p > .05and F (3, 82) = 
0.244, p > .05.  
The total recall of list items, total recall of critical lures, and the total number of 
intrusions for each of the four conditions of the experiment are also displayed in Table 1.  
On average, the survival condition had the highest total recall of list items, followed by 
the moving, pleasantness, and death conditions.  Those in the death condition had the 
highest number of false memories, followed by the moving, survival, and pleasantness 
groups.  Further, the moving group had the greatest recall of intrusions, or words that 
were neither critical lures nor list items, followed by the death, survival, and pleasantness 
groups.   
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A one-way between subject ANOVA showed that there was no significant 
difference between conditions in the overall recall of list items, F (3, 82) = 0.238 p > .05.   
A significant difference was found between conditions in the overall recall of critical 
lures, F (3, 82) = 0.006, p > .05. Using the Tukey HSD test, post hoc comparisons 
revealed the death condition significantly differed from the pleasantness condition in the 
total number of false memories recalled.  The survival and moving conditions did not 
significantly differ from the other conditions.     
An analysis of cumulative recall scores to determine the type of processing 
participants in the various conditions performed on the recall scores is presented in 
Figure 1. The figure illustrates the curves for the pleasantness, moving, and death 
conditions were nearly identical. Further, the survival condition curve was considerably 
higher than the curves produced by the other groups, and diverged early in the recall 
period.   This difference continued throughout the remainder of the ten minutes.  As can 
be seen, the survival curve initially approaches the asymptote at a rapid rate for the first 
four minutes, before gradually tapering off for the remainder of the recall period. 
An analysis of cumulative recall scores to determine the type of processing 
participants in the various conditions performed on the critical lures is presented in 
Figure 2. As can be seen, the death condition produced a curve higher than all other 
conditions.  Moreover, the death processing and moving condition curves were the most 
similar initially with a rapid approach to the asymptote.  Eventually, those in the moving 
condition began to recall slightly fewer items than those in the death condition. The 
pleasantness curve was the lowest; participants in this condition recalled the fewest false 
memories.  Those in the survival condition produced slightly more false memories than 
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those in the pleasantness condition, but considerably less than those in the moving, and 
death conditions.  Both the survival and pleasantness conditions show slower, steadier 
curves throughout the recall period when compared with the moving and death 
conditions.   
 
Discussion 
 
The present experiment was designed to test whether rating words for their 
survival significance, death significance, moving significance, and pleasantness value 
would influence the formation of false memories utilizing the DRM paradigm.  In 
particular, the study investigated whether death processing and survival processing share 
underlying mechanisms. It was predicted that if the two processes are similar, then 
participants in the survival and death conditions should recall a similar number of list 
items and critical lures. Cumulative-recall curves were assessed to analyze the extent 
participants used item-specific and relational processing while encoding the words in the 
various experimental conditions.   
The results revealed no significant difference in positive or negative affect as a 
function of condition This finding suggests the rating tasks had no influence over the 
participants’ emotional states.  Therefore, the results cannot be explained in terms of 
participants’ emotional reactions to the various scenarios they were presented.   
The results did not replicate previous findings, specifically Nairne et al.’s (2007) 
original discovery, in which those placed into the survival-processing group experienced 
a memory enhancement effect.  Although the survival group appeared to do better 
numerically than the other conditions with reference to the total number of list items 
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recalled, the ANOVA produced no significant difference between conditions. 
Participants’ memory systems were not more responsive to the encoding of words 
processed for their relevance to survival when compared with moving, pleasantness, and 
death conditions.  If a larger sample size were used, the results may well have shown a 
significant difference between groups on the total number of list items recalled, and 
would have provided additional support for the memorial benefits brought about by 
survival processing.  
The cumulative recall of list items showed that participants given the survival 
scenario had numerically greater recall than those in the moving scenario.  Moreover, the 
results are also consistent with Burns et al.’s (2011) discovery that survival-rating tasks 
produce significantly higher curves than pleasantness-rating tasks.  
As can be seen in Figure 1, during the first four minutes of recall, the steep initial 
slope of the recall curve for the survival group implies more relational processing was 
occurring relative to the other conditions. Overall, the death, moving, and pleasantness 
conditions produced nearly identical recall curves.  Following the first four minutes, all 
four groups tended to recall the same amount during each minute, suggesting all groups 
performed an equivalent amount of item-specific information. This finding is consistent 
with Burns, et al.’s (2011) proposal that survival processing is superior to control 
conditions that elicit either item specific or relational processing because survival 
processing utilizes both item specific and relational processing during the encoding of 
stimuli. Based on the current study, the traditional memory advantage conferred by 
survival processing, to the extent that it occurred, may be due to a combination of both 
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item specific and relational processing. These findings also imply dying and survival 
scenarios do not result in similar underlying processes or mechanisms.  
The results clearly contradict the Burns, Hart and Kramer (2013) finding that 
dying scenarios precluding survival processing produce memorial benefits to the same 
extent as survival scenarios. In the present study, the death condition produced the lowest 
average total recall of list items, which was lower than both the moving and pleasantness 
control conditions (Table 1). Therefore, processing words for their relevance to dying 
does not appear to lead to memory improvements.  It is not clear why the present study 
failed to replicate previous findings. One possible reason for failing to replicate the 
finding that death processing improves recall as much as survival processing is that in 
previous studies words were unrelated to each other, whereas in the present study the 
DRM words were related.  
The results of the present study were consistent with Klein’s (2012) study, which 
found the survival scenario produced the highest numerical recall, while the dying 
scenario produced lower recall that was most similar to the pleasantness scenario recall.  
Arguably, Klein’s findings may have been inaccurate because he failed to control for 
word congruity.  Word congruity is the finding that words given higher scores are 
remembered better than words given lower scores on rating tasks.  Therefore, although 
word ratings were not analyzed for the current study, if the ratings had been the same 
across the different groups then this similarity could explain the inability to replicate 
previous studies that have found no difference in recall levels between survival and dying 
scenarios.     
Although the results showed no significant difference, the survival condition 
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appeared to produce more false memories than the pleasantness condition, but fewer false 
memories than both the moving and death conditions.  Thus, Otgar and Smeets’ (2010) 
and Howe and Derbish’s (2010) findings that survival processing increases the 
prevalence of false memories were not replicated in the current study.   
Interestingly, those in the death condition significantly differed from those in the 
pleasantness control condition by producing the highest number of falsely recalled items 
or critical lures. Thus, death processing in my study behaved in a similar manner to 
survival processing in the Otgaar and Smeets (2010) and Howe and Derbish’s (2010) 
study.  
Evolutionary theory has the potential to explain this novel finding. When humans 
first attained the ability to understand time, they began engaging in activities that would 
benefit future survival, such as planting crops and establishing permanent settlements.  
When there is anticipation and awareness of future events, resources are used with future 
survival in mind.  On the other hand, when the future appears uncertain, or bleak, limited 
resources are invested for future endeavors.  The mind may act in a similar manner.  
When there is no hope for the future, which is what the participants in the death scenario 
were instructed to imagine, there is no need to allocate cognitive resources to accurately 
take in and thoroughly process incoming data.  Those in the mortality salience group 
might have reserved more mental energy when compared with the other groups when 
engaging in the rating task, which could cause the increase in falsely recalled items.  (Of 
course, whereas this explanation accounts for my findings, it does not explain previous 
findings of greater false memories following survival processing.)  
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If false memories may be understood according to fuzzy trace theory, then those 
in the death condition, because of the reduction in cognitive resources allocated to the 
present task, might have encoded a less detailed initial trace, which could explain the 
increase in false memories.  In terms of source monitoring theory, when the information 
was initially encoded for those in the death processing condition, the basis for the 
information (either internal or external) would be less likely to be recorded in memory 
because of the lower mental resources allocated to the task, and therefore individuals 
would have been more likely to perceive the information as externally generated, leading 
to an increase in the recall of the critical lures.  
According to these explanations, however, the death group should have produced 
the lowest recall of actual list words.  Thus, these speculations cannot explain the finding 
that the death group produced the highest recall of actual list words.  
An additional anomaly that could explain the inability to replicate previous 
findings is the group standard deviations for the recall scores of the present study were 
quite large relative to typical recall standard deviations. Standard deviations for the recall 
of list items for survival, dying, pleasantness, and moving were: 9.10, 7.04, 10.75, and 
6.99 respectively.  The high variability among participants’ recall scores suggests 
participants might have approached the task using different techniques, or some might 
have been more serious than others to cause the large standard deviations.  In the future it 
would be interesting to expound on the relationship between death processing and the 
generation of false memories. Further research is necessary to elucidate the robustness of 
the effect.   
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Table 1.  
Mean Performance Measures as a Function of the Type of Rating Task 
________________________________________________________________________
    Survival       Dying    Pleasantness     Moving 
Performance Measure         Mean SD      Mean SD    Mean SD         Mean SD 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Positive Affect  2.70   0.55    2.69   0.68     3.03   0.75       2.69 0.55       
Negative Affect  1.38    0.26   1.54    0.59    1.27   0.26       2.69 0.55   
Total Recall List items 33.20  9.10   28.29  7.04   28.65 10.75     29.72 6.99 
Total Recall Critical Lures 1.55 1.19    2.46    1.56    1.20   0.70      1.91  1.06 
Total Recall Intrusions 1.65   2.03    2.83     3.34    0.70   0.57      3.73  4.07 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 1. Mean cumulative number of list items recalled correctly as a function of the 
type of rating task. 
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Figure 2. Mean cumulative number of items recalled correctly as a function of the type of 
rating task. 
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Appendix I 
 
List words used in the present experiment in the order they were presented to 
participants.Words in bold are critical lures. 
 
Sleep Smell Flag Beautiful  
bed rose freedom ugly 
rest nose pendant pretty 
tired hear symbol girls 
dream see stars woman 
wake whiff anthem picture 
blanket scent stripes lady 
slumber reek raised snow 
snore stench national scene 
nap fragrance checkered gorgeous  
peace  perfume emblem day  
 Butterfly Music Soft King 
moth rhythm light Queen 
wing note pillow England 
bird sound  plush Crown 
fly sing loud Prince 
yelllow band cotton Dictator 
flower melody fur Palace 
cocoon horn touch Throne 
summer concert fluffy Chess 
color instrument skin Rule 
worm  art tender Subjects 
 
 Mountain Girl 
hill boy 
valley female 
climb young 
top dress 
molehill hair 
peak niece 
plain dance 
glacier aunt 
climber daughter  
ski sister 
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